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NOTES
The Powers of the Equity Receivership, Bankruptcy and 77B Courts over
Property in the Possession of a Pledgee or Mortgagee
The major function of any legal device which seeks to aid a distressed
debtor (whether by liquidation or rehabilitation) being the disposition or application of his assets, an important inquiry is the extent of control that the court
in the exercise of this function has over particular "property" of the debtorproperty in the possession of a pledgee or mortgagee at the time the petition is
filed, an adjudication made, or petition approved. Is this "property" as the
term is used by the statutes setting up two of the three available devices?
The extra-legal significance of this problem is obvious. With the increasing
insistence by banks and -commercial lenders-that loans be secured-it will be interesting to see whether this conservatism is founded on a misapprehension of
immunity from court control in the event of the debtor's distress, or, if this
immunity has been a fact, whether it has been breached by the recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. Other creditors, too, are interested in the ability
of the court to reach out and bring within court control and administration this
asset of the debtor.
Equity
Equity receivership through the general creditor's bill being non-statutory,
the principles governing the control by the court over property in the possession
of a mortgagee or pledgee should be the result of inductive reasoning.
But as to mortgagees in possession induction fails, for research discloses
no cases on the problem.1 Yet reasonably accurate principles are deducible from
basic theories of equity jurisdiction. The equity court, acting essentially in
personam against the debtor, may obtain control of property in the possession
of the debtor through its appointment of the receiver (who is an officer of the
court) to take possession of the debtor's property. 2 Per contra the absence of
possession by the debtor inhibits the court's control,3 and, consequently, property in the possession of the mortgagee must escape the equity receivership
court. Add to this disability the additional difficulties that the court's jurisdiction is limited to its own district 4 and that it must yield to a court that has first
i. In Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake Street Elevated Ry. Co., 177 U. S. 5i (0oo),
a, trustee under the mortgage brought a creditor's bill in equity asking for the appointment of
a receiver, and alleging that the debtor had defaulted and foreclosure was pending. Later the
same day, the debtor obtained a state court injunction on the ground that the trustee was unsatisfactory to most of the bondholders. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of the
injunction on the theory that the jurisdiction of the federal equity court had first attached
because the action there had preceded the state court action. While this case involves the
problem of conflict of jurisdiction and raises no question as to who was in possession of the
mortgaged premises, it does indicate that the equity receivership court will assume jurisdiction over mortgaged property as part of the debtor's property.
2. 2 GERiDES, CoapoRATE REORGAxizATois (1936) § 85o.
3. Ibid. See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Frank Waterhouse & Co., 279 Fed. 750 (W.
D. Wash. 1922) where one of the court's reasons for denying. the receiver's application for
an injunction against sale of collateral was the fact that the receiver had no possession;
Wood v. National Corp., 265 Fed. 791, 792 (E. D. Pa. i9i) (the basic distinction between
summary and plenary jurisdiction is that in the former the court has possession). Cf. McMullen v. Hurley, 291 Fed. 374 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) ; Atwater v. Community Fuel Corp., 298
Fed. 455 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
4. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932), reV'g sub nwnr.
Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, Inc., 58 F. (2d) lo22 (N. D. Ill. 1932) ; 2 GMuDES, loc.
cit. supra note 2.
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obtained jurisdiction of the property," and it is readily seen that the receivership
court's avowed purpose to accomplish rehabilitation is more than hampered by
the absence of adequate tools.
Pledged property, on the other hand, suffers neither from dearth of cases
nor oversight of textwriters. Statements of the latter are somewhat dubious,
while the former sometimes suffer from misapprehension of precedent, and, as
Pomeroy accurately concludes, "The question of the prior lienholder's right to
enforce his lien by process is one on which the cases are far from uniform." 7
Only one writer denies the power of the equity receivership court to control property in the possession of the pledgee on complete lack of jurisdiction,
which would logically follow as in the case of the mortgagee." Others more
guardedly refer to such limited grounds for denying relief as that a pledgee
can't be deprived of the right to sell or to possess the property, 9 and that the court
may not interfere with the pledgee's power of sale.10 This latter rule, it has
been suggested, varies with the locale.1 - Unsubstantiated remains another
writer's statement that, while the pledgee's rights to sell may not be interfered
with, his remedies may be affected by court action.' 2
The cases seem to support none of these views. Most frequently cited as
denying the court's control is Risk v. Kansas Trust & Banking Co.'" Here a
bondholder sought to get from the possession of the receiver collateral that had
been pledged with a trustee to secure the bond issue. The court, after granting
the application but maintaining control by appointing a trustee to sell the 4collateral and to apply the proceeds against the bonds, proceeded gratuitously: 1
"The appointment of a receiver of an insolvent corporation . . . does not
avoid its contracts with secured creditors or deprive them or their trustees
of the right to possess, control and enforce their securities."
As can be seen, the case is not on point, because it involved property not in the
possession of the pledgee but in the
hands of the receiver, and over which the
5
court finally did exercise control.1
In two cases ' 6 involving the converse situation, i. e., where the receiver
sought to compel the pledgee to turn over the collateral, the court denied the
prayer, but in neither case did it deny its power, 7 it merely deemed inexpedient
5.Farmers Loan &Trust Co. v. Lake Street Elev. Ry. Co., 177 U. S. 51 (Igoo) ; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Frank Waterhouse & Co., 279 Fed. 750 (W. D. Wash. 1922); 1
SMITH, REcEivxas (Tardy's 2d ed. 192o) § 257.
6. But cf. Graselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., Inc., 252 Fed. 456, 459 (C. C.

A. 2d, x9x8) : "A court of equity's modes of relief are not fixed and rigid. It can mold its
remedies to meet the conditions with which it has to deal."
7. 4 PoMiaoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE (4th ed. igig) § 1578.
8. 2 Gmw s, loc. cit. supra note 2 (but cf. § 853, n.19).
9. 2 CLARac, REcEavEas (2d ed. 1929) § 968; I SMITH, op. cit. Supra note 5, at § 266.
10. HOIMROOX & Aimam,CAsv_

n.77.

ON THE LAW OF BAaxx u~rcy (Billig's 3d ed.

II. 2 GmEws, op. cit. supra note 2, at
12. I SMITH, loc. cit. supra note 9.
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§ 853, n.19.

13. 58 Fed. 45 (C. C. D. Kans. 1893).
14. Id. at 46. See Merrill v. National Bank, 173 U. S.131, 14r (1899) : "The creditor
. . . cannot be deprived . . . of the particular security he has taken."
15. See Real Estate Trust Co. v. New England Loan & Trust Co., 93 Fed. 70 (C. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1899) where the court obtained the same result as the Risk Case.
16. Carey v. McMillan, 289 Fed. 380 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Hendrie & Bolthoff Mfg. &
Supply Co. v. Beck, 72 Colo. 387, 211 Pac. 365 (1922).
17. In fact, the Colorado court intimates that it has this power. 72 Colo. 387, 389, 211
Pac. 365, 366. But see Horn v. Pere Marquette R. R. Co., I51 Fed. 626, 629 (C. C. E. D.

Mich. i9o7) (so far as the petition seeks to recover money in the hands of lienor against
which a valid lien is asserted, the receiver cannot proceed summarily).
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the grant of the petition in view of the particular factual situation. In an
analogous situation, where the receiver sought property that was in the possession
of a lienor for labor and materials on the ground that the lienor had given up
possession by obtaining a court attachment, a summary turn-over order was
granted, with the intimation that in the absence of the attachment the order
would not have been granted.'
And where a bank held deposits of the debtor
which it sought to set-off against a debt, the court refused to grant a summary
turn-over order on the ground that the bank was an adverse claimant.' 9 Thus
only one court, and then by way of dictum in a non-pledge case, considers the
absence of possession as a bar to jurisdiction over the pledged property.
Where a pledgee has already duly sold the collateral, equity has refused to
interfere. 20 Although the rationale of these decisions revolves about questionable authority,2' the result is proper in that no benefit would be secured by
upsetting the sale, there being no allegation that the price obtained was unfair
or that the debtor was prejudiced.
Where the receiver seeks to enjoin a proposed sale of collateral by the
pledgee, an apparent conflict exists. In Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Railway
Steel Spring Co., 22 a receiver was appointed with the usual accompanying order
against anyone's selling or interfering with the debtor's assets or property.
The district court granted him an injunction against the sale by the pledgee of
the debtor's own mortgage bonds given to secure the debtor's note. The circuit
court sustained the decree on the curious ground that, while these bonds were
not assets or property of the debtor (being simply its own promise), their sale
would interfere with the debtor's property in the hands of the receiver because
it would increase the number of claimants entitled to participate in the distribution of the assets. On the other hand, a creditor's prayer for an injunction
under similar facts was denied in another district.2 3 Two additional cases refused to restrain sale by the pledgee, one on the ground that the jurisdiction of
24
another court had attached first,
and the other that the territorial jurisdiction
25
of the court was too narrow.
While none of these cases support the broad view of the writers that equity
has no jurisdiction over the pledged property-in fact, the result in one case is
flatly contra--here again, as in the case of mortgaged property, the power of
the equity receivership court seems usually, on one ground or another, inadequate
to meet the situation.
Bankruptcy
In contrast with the equity receivership, bankruptcy is a statutory device,
and the powers of the bankruptcy court must proceed from some positive
statutory statement or judicial interpretation thereof. Since the bankruptcy
court is an equity court 26 it will be interesting to note whether its control over
18. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Johnson, 275 Fed. 112 (E. D. Mich. 1921).
19. Wheaton v. Daily Telegraph Co., 124 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o3). But the dogma
is that a lienor is not an adverse claimant. Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U. S. I (1924).
2o. Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co., 81 Fed. 439 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1896); International Banking Corp. v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 242 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920).
21. In both these cases the court relied on a leading case in the bankruptcy field; in the
latter case the dictiom in the Risk case was cited.
22. 258 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
23. Rogers Brown & Co. v. Tindel Morris Co., 271 Fed. 475 (E. D. Pa. ig2i).
24. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Frank Waterhouse & Co., 279 Fed. 750 (W. D. Wash.
1922).

25. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 6i F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932), rev'g sub
nom. Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, 58 F. (2d) io22 (N. D. Ill. 1932).
26. BANKRUPTCY AcT, § 2, 30 STAT. 545 (1898), i1 U. S. C. A. § ii (1927) ; 2 GERDES,
op. cit. supra note 2, at § 845. But cf. Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 321 (193i) ; bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is exclusive within field defined by law and is in rem.
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property in the possession of a mortgagee or pledgee has been enlarged or
limited.
The mortgage cases show no overwhelming concern as to who was in possession at the time the petition was filed or the adjudication made. Thus in
the famous case of Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co.27 the Supreme Court
reversed a decree of foreclosure made by a non-bankruptcy court where the
foreclosure proceedings had been begun after adjudication. There is no evidence as to who was in possession of the property at the time of the petition in
bankruptcy, but the theory of Mr. Justice Roberts that the adjudication vested
legal title in the trustee in bankruptcy and constructive possession (with consequent exclusive jurisdiction) in the bankruptcy court, 28 leads to the sugges29
tion that the trustee may divest the possession of a mortgagee.
In two cases where a mortgagee sold the property which had been in the
possession of the trustee in bankruptcy the sales were declared void. 0 But no
emphasis was placed on the fact that the property was in the trustee's possession
instead of the mortgagee's; the title theory was relied on. The effect of this
theory was to some extent qualified in In re North Star Ice & Coal Co., 31
where, in a mortgagee's unsuccessful petition to resist sale by the trustee, the
court said that, while the trustee's title is limited to the equity of the mortgagor,
the court may regulate the enforcement 23of the lien in order to realize as much
as possible from the mortgagor's equity.
The same indifference to the fact of possession exists where injunctions
against sale under the mortgage are sought. Two cases enjoin the sale by the
mortgagee, 3 but in neither case is there evidence as to who held the property.
Both cases proceed on a theory that finds recognition in other situations: 34 when
the courts were confronted with the contention that this result was contra
Section 67d " they replied that this Section extends protection to the lien but
doesn't preserve the remedy. 6
This disregard of possession is not concurred in by courts in dicta in nonmortgage cases nor by text-writers, for they pronounce the doctrine that possession determines the control of the bankruptcy court, 37 with the necessary corollary
that the bankruptcy court cannot control property in the possession of a mortgagee at the time of the petition.8 No case, however, seems to have presented
U. S. 734 (193).
28. Accord: Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342 (1933).
29. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, at 737 (1931).
27. 282

30. In re Hasie, 206 Fed. 789 (N. D. Tex. 1913) ; Cohen v. Nixon & Wright, 236 Fed.
407 (S. D. Ga. 1916).
31. 252 Fed. 301 (E. D. Tenn. 1918).
32. Id. at 303.
33. In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o5) ; Allebach v.
Thomas, 16 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927), cert. denied,274 U. S. 744 (1927).
34. I SMITH, 10c. cit. supra note 9.

35. "Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon
this Act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if
record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall not be affected by this Act." 30
STAr. 564 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § iO7 (927).
36. But see Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 2o6 U. S. 28, 41 (907) [aff'g It re Mertens, 144
Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o6)] where the Court said that the Bankruptcy Act did not attempt
to deprive the lienor of any remedy which the law of the state vested him with.
37. Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co., Inc. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426, 431, n. 8, 431 (1924) (judgment lien) ; Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 321 (1931) (judgment lien) ; 2 GERDES, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at § 851; McGinnis, The Sale of Collateral Security by the Pledgee thereof
after the Intervention of the Bankruptcy of the Pledgor (1934) 9 IND. L. J. 195, 21o, n. 12,
215, n. 14.

38. See 2 GERDES, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 851; GLEml, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 525.
This must not be confused with situations where a state court has taken possession of the
property prior to the petition in foreclosure proceedings, as to which see Straton v. New, 283
U. S. 318, 326, n. 6 et seq. (1931) ; 2 GERDEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 892.
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the question squarely to a court, and considerable doubt must remain whether
the limitation, which has its origin in the in personam jurisdiction of the equity
court, will survive the strong implications of the Isaacs case.
The pledge cases vary considerably in reasoning and result. In re Cobb
reverses a finding that the pledgee is entitled to retain collateral until paid. The
language of the court indicates a rationale referred to thirty-two years later in
the Isaacs case, i. e., that the trustee gets title and constructive possession and
the consequent right to recover the possession of the collateral from anyone
holding it, subject of course to a valid lien.40 The force of this reasoning is
much diminished by the eventual conclusion that the lien itself was invalid
because created within four months. 41
The leading case cited for the proposition that the bankruptcy court has no
42
control over collateral in the pledgee's possession is Hiscock v. Varick Bank.
The pledgee, having sold the collateral after the petition but one day before the
adjudication, filed a claim for the deficiency. The referee refused to allow the
claim and ordered a resale of the collateral. The Supreme Court reversed the
referee's finding and held the sale proper, merely indicating judicial reluctance
to upset a sale where no fraud is alleged, and where a resale could serve no
valuable purpose in view of Section 67d.48 But that the court is without power
to the court need not be made
to restrain a proposed sale, or that application
44
before sale, does not necessarily follow.
An interesting tendency appears in the injunction cases. The weight of
authority, numerically at least, denies the power of the bankruptcy court to
enjoin the sale by the pledgee of his collateral. The earliest case (arising in fact
before the current Bankruptcy Act) is Jerome v. McCarter.45 The facts of the
case are unclear, involving principally the contention of the debtor's assignees
that prior mortgagees should be joined in a bill to foreclose a junior mortgage.
Apparently the validity of a sale of collateral by pledgees was involved because
the Court says :48
cc...
the position that pledgees could not sell the pledge after adjudication in bankruptcy is quite untenable."
And in reference to bonds still pledged: 17
..
. pledgees have a clear right to use them, either by sale or by collection, until the full amount of the debts due from the mortgagors is satisfied."
Subsequent cases have denied the injunction, giving various reasons. One
case 48 in which the problem arose squarely denied the prayer of an unsecured
creditor for an injunction on the authority of the Jerome case. Another case 49
reversed the grant of an injunction on the authority of Hiscock v. Varick Bank.
Where it was shown that the debtor no longer owned the collateral pledged, an
39. 96 Fed. 821 (E. D. N. C. 1899).
40. Id. at 823. But see GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 525.
41. BANKRUPTCY ACT, §67c, 30 STAT. 564 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § 107 (1927).
42. 206 U. S. 28 (19oy), aff'g It re Mertens, 144 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906).
43. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § 107 (927).
44. See Grabosky v. Kephart, 72 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934) [aff'g It, re Belber,
7 F. Supp. 762 (E. D. Pa. 1934)] where the court denied the petition of the pledgee for leave
to sell. But see 2 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) § 923.

45. 94 U.S. 734 (2876).

46. Id. at 739.
47. Id. at 74o.
48. In re Ironclad Mfg. Co., i92 Fed. 318 (C. C. A.2d, 1912).
49. In re Mayer, 157 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o7).
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injunction was modified. 50 In only one case was the fact that the bankruptcy
court was not possessed of the property made the basis of the denial of an
injunction.5 1 And only a single case took the view52 that the bankruptcy court
had no control over sale by the pledgee in possession.
On the other hand, there has been a recognizable recent tendency to grant
this injunction. The first breach in the bulwark protecting the pledgee appeared
in two cases where the injunction was granted in aid of some positive action by
pledge; , and, pendthe trustee in bankruptcy: to aid the trustee to redeem the
55
ing a plenary suit, to determine rights of adverse parties. 54 In re Henry was
the first flat decision granting the injunction. the court relying on the Isaacs
case. And this position was strengthened by a recent judicial expression that
this injunctive power is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court. 58 That
the view expressed by these recent cases is the more desirable one and represents a reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act,5 7 is hardly disputable.

77B Courts
The most recent device to aid distressed debtors, Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, raises a new problem. Since the reorganization court has already
the powers of the equity and bankruptcy courts, 58 the question arises whether
the other provisions of Section 77B have given the reorganization court powers
beyond that of its contemporaries as regards property in the possession of a
mortgagee or pledgee. If the degree of control has been increased, on what
theory or on what provision of the section is it based?
The mortgage cases afford an interesting comparison of results in three
fact-situations-when the property at the time of the petition is in the possession
of (i) the debtor; (2) a receiver under state or federal court foreclosure proceedings; (3) a mortgagee. In a case involving the first situation, the debtor
was in possession after the mortgagee had foreclosed because the mortgagee
5o. John Matthews, Inc. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 192 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
5. It re Hudson River Navigation Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). The
court thought also that, while 3§ 67d and 57h concern primarily the right, the lack of possession by the court extends the immunity to the forum as well. Id. at 176. See Legis.
(1935) 35 CoL. L. REV. 98, ioi.
52. It re Browne, 1O4 Fed. 762 (E. D. Pa. igoo). See i CoLIER, BANKRUPTCY (I3th
ed. 1923) 110; 2 GERDES, Op. cd. supra note 2, at § 851; HoLBRooK & AiaMER, loc. cit. supra
note 10; 2 REmINGTON, loc. cit. supra note 46; 5 id. § 2510; Legis. (935) 35 Col. L. REV.
98. One case goes to the extent of denying the trustee in bankruptcy the surplus from the
sale of collateral by a pledgee where the pledgee held an unsecured note also. In re Searles,
2oo Fed. 893 (E. D. N. Y. 1912). See, too, Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 676 (1935) : "It may be that in an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding the issue of an injunction in the circumstances here presented would not
be sustained."
53. In re International Fuel & Iron Corp., 21 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
54. It re Purkett, Douglass & Co., 50 F. (2d) 435 (S. D. Cal. [931).
55. 50 F. (2d) 453 (E. D. Pa. 1931), 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 123. For a criticism of this
holding see 2 GERDEs, op. cit. supra note 2, § 853, n. 19; McGinnis, The Sale, of Collateral
Security by the Pledgee Thereof After the Intervention of the Bankruptcy of the Pledgor
(1934) 9 IN. L. 3. 195, 216; Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 412, 419.
56. In re Belber, 7 F. Supp. 762 (E. D. Pa. 1934), aff'd sub norn., Grabosky v. Kephart,
72 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
57. Section 2 (I5), 30 STAT. 545 (I98), II U. S. C. A. § II (15) (1927); §57h, 30 STAT.
56a (iS9S), ii U. S. C. A. §93h (1927); and §7oa, 30 STAT. 565 (88), ii U. S. C. A.
§ Iloa (1927) lead to the conclusion that the Act did not intend to raise jurisdictional bars to
the court's power. The pledgee's rights are adequately protected by § 67d. Certainly the
objection made that collateral prices fluctuate rapidly and might injure the pledgee is met by
the reminder that this is an equitable power and will not be exercised if harm is imminent.
58. §§77B (a), (k), 48 STAT. 912, 92r (1934), I1 U. S. C. A. §§207 (a), (k) (Supp.
1935).
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wished the debtor to continue managing the property. The trustee in bankruptcy obtained a court order compelling the debtor to turn the property over
to him on the theory that the trustee succeeds to the property of which the
9
debtor was in possession at the time of the filing and approval of the petition.
In another case, the trustee successfully sought an order compelling the purchaser from the mortgagee to reconvey to the trustee, where the sale was made
after the approval of the petition. 60 However, the court did not rely on the
debtor's possession, but announced a new theory: that since the equity of
redemption exceeded the debt, it is property of the debtor to which the trustee
is entitled, and over which the court has exclusive jurisdiction under Section
77B (a) 61
Under the second fact-situation, two cases involved a request for a stay of
the foreclosure proceedings which had started before the petition had been
filed. In both cases the stay was refused. One court went on the theory that, assuming that the court had the power, it was inadvisable here; 62 the other, on the
ground that something more than the8 mere filing of the petition under Section
77B is necessary to support the stay.
The cases involving the third fact-situation offer a contrast in result and
reasoning. The leading case of Grand Boulevard Investment Co. v. Strauss 64
was a situation where the trustee under the mortgage indenture had taken possession of the property after default. A petition under Section 77B having
been filed, the debtor prayed for an order to compel the trustee-mortgagee to
turn over the property. On the specific issue whether the reorganization court
had this power, the circuit court reversed the lower court's finding that it did
not have such power. The court adopted the language of the now famous
Rock Island case 6 5 almost in toto, even though that case arose under Section 77
and involved a pledge of collateral. While the reasoning of that case (and
therefore the instant case) is somewhat diffuse, the major ground 6is that the
debtor's equity is "property" within the meaning of Section 77B(a),1 and that
consequently the court has exclusive jurisdiction over that property. The language of the court in the Strauss case is unequivocal: 67
59. In re 1O3O N. Dearborn Building Corp., 9 F. Supp. 97z (E. D. II. 1935), app. dismnissed, C. C. A. 7th, March 18, 1935.
6o. In re Norfolk Weavers, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 495 (D. Del. 1935).
the court in which such order approv61. "If the petition or answer is so approved, ...
ing the petition or answer is entered shall, during the pendency of the proceedings under this

section, have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located ..
48 STAT. 912 (934), II U. S. C. A. § 207 (a) (Supp. 1935).
62. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). This uncertainty
is not shared by Mr. Justice Cardozo, who said in Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans,
56 Sup. Ct. 412, 415 (1936), that the suit may be stayed or enjoined under the authority of

§ 77B (c) (lo).

63. In re Coney Island Hotel Corp., 76 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), re-'g 9 F.
Supp. 329 (E. D. N. Y. 1934).
64. 78 F. (2d) i8o (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; cf. In re Manbeach Realty Corp., io F. Supp.
523 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
65. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648
(1935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 913.
66. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), I1 U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (Supp. 1935). For a comparison of
what the courts deem a sufficient interest to be "property" within the meaning of this section,
see In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied sub non.,
Troutman v. Compton, 294 U. S. 725 (1935) ; in re Argyle-Lake Shore Bldg Corp., 78 F.
(2d) 491 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) ; In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 79 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 368 (1936) ; In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 144 (1935), 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 250; In re Ideal Laundry, IO F. Supp. 719 (N. D. Cal. 1935) ; Thomas v. Winslow, i iF. Supp. 839 (W. D. N. Y.
1935) ; In re Prudence Co., Inc., C. C. H. No. 3904 (C. C. A. 2d, Marcf 9, 1936) ; Legis.
(935) 35 COL. L. REv. 98, ioi; Note (1936) 49 HAv. L. Rav. 797.
67. 78 F. (2d) I8o, 185 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
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"Our conclusions are that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in proceedings under Section 77B has been extended by Sections 77A and 77B
so that it includes all of the property of the debtor, wherever located, even
if such property is in the possession of a lienholder, and even if such possession has continued for more than four months prior to the initial petition of the debtor under Section 77B; and that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition here in controversy; and in the exercise of
its discretion, to grant or deny the prayer of said petition upon the merits
thereof."
In a situation almost the exact counterpart of the Strauss case another circuit
reached a contrary result."8 The lower court had granted an order to compel
the mortgagee in possession to turn over the rents and the property. This was
reversed apparently on the ground that, while the court had the power to enjoin
a sale by virtue of the Rock Island case, it could not make a turnover order. 9
In the most recent case reported involving this situation, a turnover order
was reversed.7 0 The case is distinct from its two predecessors in its reasoning.
Relying on a dictum that in Illinois the mortgagee in possession after default
becomes the legal owner, 7 1 the court took the next logical step that the mortgagee could not be deprived of his own property. The wisdom of carrying the
title theory of mortgages to this conclusion is highly questionable; certainly no
other court has gone so far.
Only one pledge case involving a turnover order has appeared under 77B.72
The pledgee of collateral securing an issue of the debtor's bonds objected to
such an order, which was part of the confirmation of the final plan. The order
was affirmed on the ground that Sections 77B (h) and 77B (b) (9) specifically
conferred this authority.7
The injunction cases, on the other hand, are more numerous. In common
with other phases of corporate reorganization, the influence of the Rock Island
case is felt here. There the Supreme Court sustained an order enjoining the
sale of collateral by pledgees.74 As pointed out in the Strauss case, the
similarity in language between Sections 77 and 77B makes this case authority
under 77B. That this is so In re Prudence-Bonds Co. 7 5 has shown. There the
3d,
U.

68. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. ipth & Walnut Sts. Corp., 79 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A.
(1936), 84
1935); see Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 56 Sup. Ct. 4I2, 41
OF PA. I REV. 782; Tuttle v. Harris, 56 Sup. Ct. 416, 417 (1936) ; cf. Central States

Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar, 8o F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 8th,

1935)

where the principal bondholder

asked the court's permission to foreclose and was told that the trustee-mortgagee who was
in possession had the sole power to foreclose; In re Landquist, 7o F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 584 (934) and Molina v. Murphy, 71 F. (2d) 6o5 (C. C. A.
1st, 1934) are comparable cases under § 74. But see the Rock Island Case at 677.
69. The attempt has been made to reconcile this decision with preceding decisions on the
ground that here was an attempt to compel a turnover of the rents, which are themselves a
pledge and that no case has gone this far. But see cases cited infra note 72.
7o. It re Francis E. Willard National Temperance Hospital, C. C. H. No. 3924 (C. C.
A. 7th, March 25, 1936).
71. Tuttle v. Harris, 56 Sup. Ct. 436, 417 (3936).
72. It re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 2,56 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; see In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 79 F. (2d) 205, 209 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 368
(3936).
73. 48 STAT. 913, 920 (1934), 1i U. S. C. A. §§2o7 (b) (9), (h) (Supp. 935).
74. It has been suggested that the ground for issuing the injunction is the fact that it
was a pledge of the debtor's own shares; Note (1935) 35 Cor. L. REv. 391 395, n. 24; cf.
Merrill v. National Bank, 173 U. S. 13 (1899); Rogers Brown & Co. v. Tindel Morris Co.,
273 Fed. 475 (E. D. Pa. ig2) ; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (3876) ; In re Mayer, 157
Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o7).
75. 77 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 3935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 95 (1935) ; cf. Ils re
Prudence Bonds Corp., 75 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 2d, 3935) where in the same litigation the
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debtor had pledged first mortgages as collateral with a trustee pledgee to secure
an issue of the debtor's own bonds. The debtor was to service the mortgages
until default on the bonds, when the trustee-pledgee was given the right to
service them. The debtor obtained an order restraining the trustees from foreclosing, selling or encumbering the pledged mortgages, and this was affirmed
strictly on the ground that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 77B (a) applies
to pledged collateral. 76 The broad language used by the pledge cases confers
this jurisdiction without any dissent.
Conclusion

The powers of the equity receivership court over property in the possession
of a mortgagee or pledgee at the time of the petition seems circumscribed
to the point of non-existence. Although it would seem theoretically proper,
the cases do not demonstrate that the absence of possession has been the
determining factor, partly because of other effective limitations on the jurisdiction of the equity receivership court, and partly because the court has failed
affirmatively to demonstrate that the denial of a particular incident of jurisdiction was due to a lack of power or the inexpediency of its exercise. The equity
cases thus throw no light on the problem faced by the reorganization court.
The bankruptcy court, which, to re-emphasize, is statutory, has not had the
opportunity to test the implications of the recent decisions in the mortgage field.
It is submitted that if the court, faced today with a situation where the mortgagee was in possession without court aid, were willing to look behind the
inaccurate dogma that the bankruptcy court's power is dependent on possession
(which inaccuracy is demonstrated by the variation in theory of the cases), it
would find a legal theory to justify assuming jurisdiction over the property.
This step has already been taken in the pledge cases where it is no longer a
question whether the court has the power, but whether it will exercise it. To
those who see, in the preponderance of judicial refusals to act, a contrary
proposition, the suggestion is offered that Section 67d has a profound bearing
on the expediency of exercise.
With a different purpose (rehabilitation and not liquidation) 7 7 and a consequently more urgent necessity, 78 the powers of the reorganization court defi-

nitely extend to property in the possession of a mortgagee or pledgee. 79 The
judicial theories vary between jurisdiction over the debtor's "equity" in the
pledge or mortgaged premises and the conclusion that the pledge or mortgaged
premises is the debtor's "property". Certainly the following language in Section 77B:
court assumed that it had sufficient jurisdiction to stay a bondholder's state court suit against
the trustee-pledgee of the collateral securing the bonds. The court considered § 77B '(a) as
probably granting this jurisdiction. Id. at 264.
76. Cf. In re Prudence Co., i2 F. Supp. 364 (E. D. N. Y. 1935) where the court authorized the debtor to continue servicing collateral that was being held by the trustee-pledgee
even though the court refused to decide whether the debtor or its principal owned the collateral.
77. In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734, 730 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied
sub. non., Troutman v. Compton, 294 U. S. 725 (1935) ; I; re Prudence Bonds Corp., 77 F.
(2d) 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 95 (i935) ; In; re Westchester Country
Club, Inc., C. C. H. No. 3642 (S. D. N. Y. October 24, 1935).
78. 2 GmaEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 847; Gerdes, Jurisdiction of the Court in Proceedings Under Section 77B (935) 4 BROOKLYx L. Rzv. 237, 251.
79. 2 GEDS, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 847; see In re Westchester Country Club, Inc.,
C. C. H. No. 3642 (S. D. N. Y. October 14, 1935). But see In re Commonwealth Bond
Corp., 77 F. (2d) 308, 309 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). Cf. It re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) g29 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 584 (1934) ; Molina v. Murphy, 71 F. (2d) 6o5 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1934) ; It re Brown, C. C. H. No. 3906 (C. C. A. 7th, March 12, 1936) for decisions

under § 74, which in many operative provisions uses the same language as § 77B.

NOTES
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"A plan of reorganization . . . shall include provisions modifying or

altering the rights of creditors generally, or of any class of them, secured
or unsecured."
".

.

. the judge . . . may . . . enjoin or stay the commencement

or continuation of suits against the debtor until after final decree..

so

makes the result inescapable.
H.K.M.

Compulsory Physical Examination of the Plaintiff in Actions for
Personal Injuries
In actions for personal injuries, very often all the proof concerning the
extent and seriousness of the injury is in the hands of the plaintiff. Under
such circumstances injustice is the obvious result unless there is some means by
which the defendant may obtain information relating to the injuries, in order
to rebut the plaintiff's testimony. Many jurisdictions have found a solution to
this problem by the use of an order proceeding from the court directing the
plaintiff to submit to a physical examination.
Apparently the first request for such an order was made in Walsh v.
Sayre,1 decided in 1868, in which the New York Superior Court held that it had
the inherent power to grant the request. But this case was subsequently repudiated. 2 The Iowa Supreme Court was the first court of last resort to pass
on the question, and it came to the same conclusion as had the earlier New York
court.3 This opinion started a wave of decisions, most of them following the
view there set forth.4 On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
fourteen years later decided that in the federal courts a trial judge did not have
the power to compel the plaintiff to submit to examination, 5 and this decision
influenced a number of courts to deny themselves such power.6 Since these
decisions, actions for personal injuries have greatly increased in number, so
that a new study of what underlies the rules laid down by these courts seems
timely.
The principal reason advanced for the view that the trial courts of our
cotintry do not have the power to order an examination is that there is no common law precedent for it.7 This is true if the authority required is a case on all
8o. §§77B (b) (I), (c) I0), 48 STAT. 912 etseq. (1934), II U. S. C. A.
1935). See also §§77B (a), (b) (5), (b) (io), (c)(3), (h), (i).
I.
§ 2220.

52 How. Pr. 334. (N.Y. 1868). See generally, 4 Wi-

oRE,

EvlDmENc

§207

(Supp.

(2d ed. 1923)

2. McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 129 N. Y. 50, 29 N. E.235 (189i).
3.Schroeder v.C. R. I. & P. R. R., 47 Iowa 375 (1877). There is a dictum to the effect
that courts have no power to order examinations, in Loyd v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R., 53
Mo.509, 515-516 (1873) (not a holding because the examination requested was unnecessary).
4. E. g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. v. Thul, 29 Kan. 466 (1883) ; White v.
Milwaukee City Ry. Co., 61 Wis. 536, 21 N. W. 524 (1884) ; see Miami & Montgomery Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio St. 104, 107 (188i). See for greater development of the historical
material, Shastid, May a Plaintiff in a PersonalInjury Suit Be Compelled to Exhlibit His
Injuries (i902) I Mice. L. Ray. 192.
5.Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (i89i).
6. E. g., Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401, 28 N. E. 86o (1891) ; Stack v.
New York, N. H. & Hartford R. R., 177 Mass. i55, 58 N. E. 686 (1goo) ; Yazoo & M. V. R.
Co. v. Robinson, 107 Miss. 192, 65 So. 241 (1914) ;'
City of Kingfisher v. Altizer, 13 Okla.
121, 74 Pac. 1o7 (1903).
7. See May v. Northern Pac. Ry., 32 Mont. 522, 330-I, 81 Pac. 328, 330 (905) ; Larson
v. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 318, 325, 97 Pac. 483, 486 (i9oS).
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fours, for no case seems to have arisen in England, prior to our adoption of the
Constitution, involving an order directing the plaintiff to undergo examination.
One explanation for this may be that at early times actions for personal injuries
were rare compared with the number at present; another, that, if an examination was requested, it was probably granted by the plaintiff without objection; 8
furthermore, the request being almost always for an examination by a physician,
it is doubtful whether prior to 1776 the status of medical diagnosis was such
as would have warranted a court in ordering an examination by physicians.9
Faced with this lack of precedent, the United States Supreme Court suggested
as a possible analogy the common law writ de ventre inspiciendo,0 which was
the practice of impanelling a jury of matrons to examine a female prisoner
who had pleaded pregnancy in order to secure a temporary respite from punishment. 1 Unfortunately, the Court rejected this analogy on the ground that the
writ had never been used in the United States and appeared to be unfit for our
civilization.12 Here the Court erred, as the writ had been used in the United
States prior to the decision,' 8 and still exists under statute. 14
The objection that to allow the order would be contrary to the spirit underlying the constitutional provisions prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
was suggested by the Texas Supreme Court.' 5 But the purpose of the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution 16 and similar state constitutional provisions 17 was to protect against the use of the general search warrant 's "and
applies to criminal prosecutions and suits for penalties and forfeitures under
the revenue laws." 19 Since a tort action cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be catalogued within that tri-partite classification, it would seem that the
Texas court's interpretation was clearly erroneous, and that compulsory examination of the plaintiff is not within the purview of the constitutional interdiction.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in holding that the trial judge did not
have the power to order an examination, based its opinion partially on the fear
that the jury would tend to overemphasize the value of the physician's testimony
because he was named by the court.20 However, the cases in jurisdictions where
the order has been granted suggest two answers: (i) The court will not appoint
a physician unless the plaintiff refuses to submit voluntarily to an examination
by the defendant's doctors.2' If the plaintiff desires to avoid the undue prejudice
attached to testimony of a court-named physician, he need only state that he is
8. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141
U. S. 250, 258 (1891).
9. An analogous situation exists today with respect to the hesitancy OS the court to admit
modem scientific aids as part of the examinations. See infra, p. iOO7.
io. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, I4I U. S. 250, 253 (I89I).
II. 4 BL. Comm. *394, *395.
12. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 253 (I891).
13. State v. Arden, I Bay 487 (S. C. 1795) ; 2 Chander, Am. Crim. Tr. 56 (Mass. 1778).
14. E. p., N. Y. CODE CRIi. PROC. (Gilbert, I935) §§ 500-502; i Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)

§§ 38o6, 3807.

i5. Austin & N. W. R. R. v. Cluck, 97 Tex. 172, i8o, 77 S. W. 4o3, 4o6 (I9O3).
16. U. S. CONST. Amend. IV.
17. E. g., IDAHO CoNsT. art. I, § I7; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 8; TENN. CoNsT. art. I, § 7;
Tzx. CoxsT. art. I, § 9.
i8. 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STA Es (5th ed. i891) § 1901.
i9. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 22o U. S. 107, 174 (1911). Cf. Camden County Beverage
Co. v. Blair, 46 F. (2d) 648 (D. N. J. 193o), aff'd, 46 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 3d, i93i).
2o. Gentry v. Gulf & S. I. R. R., iog Miss. 66, 72, 67 So. 849, 85o (915).
21. Landis v. Wichita R. & Light Co., no Kan. 205, 203 Pa. inOg (1922).
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willing to be examined by the defendant's experts. (2) An excellent practice
of the Missouri courts may be utilized. When these courts specify physicians
to make an examination, the latter become officers of the court and are not the
witnesses of either party.22 Since they are therefore more likely to give a
truthful and unbiased account of the extent of the injuries than are experts
employed by the litigants, the objection that the jury might give too much weight
to such testimony becomes imperceptible, for overemphasis of truth is hardly
objectionable.
The jurisdictions that follow the Iowa rule permitting trial courts to order
physical examinations have a single motive--to get at the truth even though a
slight inconvenience may be caused the plaintiff.23 Thus, in Alabama Great So.
R. R. v. Mil1,2 4 the court stated that justice would be rare if the evidence were
limited to the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses, recognizing that
such testimony tends to be biased and partisan despite the physicians' efforts
to be perfectly honest. Occasionally, too, the plaintiff will offer no medical
testimony, and yet will allege internal injuries of which no trace is visible to
the jury.25 In such case, the necessity for power to order examination is obvious, for otherwise the only evidence to guide the jury would be the unsupported word of the plaintiff.
The courts which have held that the trial judge has the power to order
examinations have overcome the Supreme Court's objection that there was no
common law precedent for this power. Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court
satisfied itself by analogizing the order with the appeal of mayhem. 26 This was
a practice in which one who had accused another of mayhem was ordered by
2
the court to submit to a physical examinationY.
In fact, one writer says that
the appeal was the forerunner of the later trespass action 28 and, therefore, it
would seem sufficiently close to the modern action for personal injuries to supply
precedent for the power to order an examination if a court should desire it.
Other courts have employed other analogies. For example, the equitable procedure of examining the respondent in a divorce action based on the ground of
impotency has been utilized.2 9 However, this analogy is open to the valid
criticism that divorce proceedings are equitable in nature, 0 while the instant
problem arises only in courts of law. That the true basis for granting the court
the power to order an examination is the desire to arrive at the truth, rather than
to award the judgment to the one best able to conceal the facts, seems to be the
one constant factor in the cases.
Summarizing, then, in a majority of the jurisdictions that have passed on
the question, the trial judge in an action for personal injuries has the power,
without a statute and despite the variety of reasons assigned by the courts, to
22. Atchison v. United Rys., 286 Mo. 634, 228 S. W. 483 (192i) ; Boggs v.
Gosser, 55
S. W. (2d) 723 (Kan. City, Mo., App. Ct. 1932).
23. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Palmore, 68 Kan. 545, 550-555, 75 Pac. 509, 5I0512 (I9O4) ; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Koonce, 4 Tenn. Civ. App. i, i8 (914) ; Lane
v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 21 Wash. ri9, 121-124, 57 Pac. 367, 367-368 (1899).
24. 9o Ala. 71, 79, 8 So. 9o, 92-3 (i89o).

25. See Sibley v. Smith, 46 Ark. 275, 277, 284 (1885).
26. Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 13x Tenn. 683, 692-694, 176 S. W. 1031, 1034
(1915).
27. 3 BL. Comm. *332. All appeals of felony were abolished by statute in 59 GEO. III,
c.46 (i8xg).
28. 2 POLLACK AND MAITLAND, HIsToRY oF ENGI.SH LAw (2d ed. i898) 526.

29. See City of Ottawa v. Gilliland, 63 Kan. i65, 171, 65 Pac. 252, 254 (Igoi) ; Lane v.
Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 21 Wash. i19, 122, 57 Pac. 367, 368 (i89).
30. Richmond v. Richmond, IO Yerg. 343 (Tenn. 1837); see Fulton v. Fulton, 36 Miss.
517, 519-20 (1858).
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order the plaintiff to undergo a physical examination. 31 In a minority of the
states3 2 and in the federal courts, 38 such power is denied.
But even the latter jurisdictions provide certain sanctions that tend to compel the plaintiff to submit to an examination at the request of the defendant,
although the court is powerless to order it. The measures assume varying
forms in the different jurisdictions. For example, in Louisiana, if the plaintiff
refuses to submit to an examination, he is not permitted to present his own
medical testimony because the court feels that otherwise the procedure smacks
of an ex parte trial.3 4 This limitation upon the plaintiff's evidence has an effect
opposite to that of the majority rule, which permits an order directing an examination. Under the majority rule the defendant's ability to present proof of
the extent and nature of the injuries is raised to the position of the plaintiff's;
under the Louisiana practice, the plaintiff is lowered to the status of the defendant, in respect to his inability to present any proof.
Another method often used in jurisdictions refusing to order examination
is to allow the defendant to ask the plaintiff whether he is willing to submit to
31. Alabama Great So. R. R. v. Hill, go Ala. 71, 8 So. go (18go); Sibley v. Smith, 46
Ark. 275 (885) ; Johnston v. Southern Pac. Co., I50 Cal. 535, 89 Pac. 348 (i9o7) limited it
scope in Anderson v. United Stages, Inc., 192 Cal. 250, 219 Pac. 748 (923) ; Cook v. Miller,
1o3 Conn. 267, 13o Atl. 571 (1925); Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719,

9 S. E. 6o2 (1888) ; City o~f South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 6o N. E. 271 (1900) ;
Schroeder v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 47 Iowa 375 (877) ; Howard v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 139 Kan. 403, 32 P. (2d). 231 (1934); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Simpson, iii
Ky. 754, 64 S. W. 733 (19O1) ; Scheffier v. Lee, 126 Md. 373, 94 At. go7r (1915) ; Graves
v. City of Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 54 N. W. 757 (893) ; Wanek v. City of Winona, 78
Minn. 98, 8o N. W. 85, (18g). In Missouri the first statement was a dictim that the court
had no power to order an examination. See Loyd v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R., 53 .Mo.
509, 5,5-16 (1873). However, the later cases, also in dicta, turned the other way. See
Shepard v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 85 Mo. 629, 634 (1885) ; Sidekum v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac.
Ry., 93 Mo. 400, 403-4, 4 S. W. 701, 103 (1887).

By 1888 the court in Owens v. Kansas

City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 95 Mo. i6g, 178, 8 S. W. 350, 352 (1888) was able to say: "The
power of the court to make and enforce an order for the personal examination of the injured
party must be taken as established in this state.. .
." All this occurred without a clear
holding; yet in Fullerton v. Fordyce, 144 Mo. 519, 44 S. W. 1053 (1897) the power is taken
for granted. State ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 98 Neb. 333, 152 N. W. 748 (3915) ; Brown
v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 12 N. D. 61, 95 N. W. 153 (9o3); S. S. Kresge Co.
v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N. E. 611 (ig3i). There is no clear holding in Pennsylvania in the upper courts, but the trial court cases show that the practice of ordering examinations has been common for many years. Lawvrence v. Keim, 45 Phila. Leg. Int. 434 (C. P.
Phila. 1888); Harvey v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 26 W. N. C. 23If (C. P. Phila. i8go);
Narzisi v. Meyer Dairy Corp., 22 D. & C. 258 (C. P. Northampton, Pa., 1933). In dicta the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court takes the power for granted. See Cohen v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 250 Pa. 15, 17, 95 Atl. 315, 316 (1915). Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works,
131 Tenn. 683, 176 S. W. 1o31 (1915) ; Bagley v. Mason, 6y Vt. 175, 37 Ati. 287 (1896)

(power taken for granted, request for order being refused because made too late) ; Lane v.
Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 21 Wash. 119, 57 Pac. 367 (1899) ; White v. Milwaukee City R.

R., 61 Wis. 536, 21 N. W. 524 (1884).

32. Mills v. Wilmington City Ry., 15 Del. 269, 40 Ati. 1114 (Super. Ct. 3894); cf.
State v. Pucca, 2o Del. 71, 55 Atl. 831 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1902); Richardson v. Nelson, 221 Ill.
254, 77 N. E. 583 (19o6) ; Kennedy v. New Orleans R. & Light Co., 142 La. 879, 77 So. 777
(1918) ; Stack v. New York, N. H. & Hartford R. R., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N. E. 686 (i9oo) ;
Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Robinson, 3O7 Miss. 192, 65 So. 241 (1914) ; May v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 32 Mont. 522, 8I Pac. 328 (8905) ; McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 129 N. Y.
50, 29 N. E. 235 (891)
; City of Kingfisher v. Altizer, 13 Okla. 121, 74 Pac. IO7 (Okla.
Terr. 1903) ; Best v. Columbia Electric St. Ry. L. & P. Co., 85 S. C. 82, 67 S. E. 1 (i9io) ;
St. Louis & S. W. Ry. v. Lindsey, 8i S. W. 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904), writ of error denied
by Texas Supreme Court, 82 S. W. xv (19o4) ; Sharp v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 48 Utah
481, i6o Pac. 438 (igi6).
33. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (3898) ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Griffin,
8o Fed. 278 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897).
34. Bailey v. Fisher,, ii La. App. 187, 123 So. 166 (I929) ; Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry.
& Light Co., 142 La. 879, 77 So. 777 (918).

NOTES

an examination.35 The question is asked in the presence of the jury, and the
effect upon the jury of the plaintiff's refusal is manifest. So strong is the
compulsion that one state, Illinois, has refused to permit such a question because
it is tantamount to ordering the examination."6
But even in a jurisdiction which ordinarily refuses to order an examination, there is one situation in which the defendant may always procure the order.
If the plaintiff voluntarily exhibits his injuries to the jury, the defendant becomes entitled to an examination as a matter of right.37 The reason given for
this rule is its close analogy to the rules relating to real evidence. 38 When the
plaintiff introduces an object into evidence the defendant may subject the object
to an examination by his own experts. By analogy, the courts feel that, when
the plaintiff uses his injuries as real evidence and offers them to the visual sense
of the jury for inspection, the defendant is entitled to have the exhibited injuries subjected to an examination by medical experts. This principle of allowing an examination when the plaintiff voluntarily takes the first step and demon4
strates his injuries is followed even in North Carolina, 39 and New Mexico, 0
where the question of the court's power to order an examination has never been
decided.
But, although most jurisdictions that have passed upon the question hold
that the defendant has the right that the court shall direct the plaintiff to submit
to a physical examination, analysis of this right shows that it is by no means
absolute, being subject to several well-defined restrictions.
The defendant must show real necessity for the examination and the request must be made far in advance of the trial.41 However, the right is optional
with the defendant, and if he does not choose to exercise it, the plaintiff may
not make any comment. This is illustrated by the case of Stubenhaver v. Kansas
City Rys.41 where counsel for the plaintiff, in his closing address, informed the
jury that although the defendant had had a right to examine his opponent's
client, the plaintiff, he had not done so, and therefore the omission should be
considered as a tacit admission of the existence of the injuries. This was held
to be reversible error; the holding is a forceful demonstration that the defendant
is never under a duty to make an examination.
Often litigation centers about the choice of the physicians who are to make
the examination. Careful scrutiny of the decisions discloses that rarely, if ever,
will the trial court's judgment in this matter be disturbed on appeal. In some
cases it has been held that the judge may allow the plaintiff to choose one of the
examining physicians, 43 may permit the defendant to name one, 44 or may make
his own choice, disregarding entirely the selections offered by the litigants.4 5
35. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hill, 36 Okla. 540, 129 Pac. 13 (1912); Austin & N. W.
Ry. v. Cluck, 97 Tex. 172, 77 S. W. 403 (1903).
36. See Mattice v. Klawans, 312 I1. 299, 143 N. E. 866 (1924); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
v. Benson, 352 Ill. 195, 2O1, 185 N. E. 244, 247 (1933).
37. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o9) ; Houston & Tex.
Cent. R. R. v. Anglin, 99 Tex. 349, 89 S. W. 966 (1905) ; Swenson v. City of Aurora, 196
Ill. App. 83 (2d Dist. 1915). But cf. Wheeler v. Chicago & W. Ind. Ry., 267 Ill. 306, 327-8,

xo8 N. E. 330, 339 (1915).

38. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62, 71 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o9) ; Winner
v. Lathrop, 67 Hun 511, 515, 22 N. Y. Supp. 516, 518 (Sup. Ct. 3d Dep't 1893).
39. Fleming v. Holleman, I9O N. C. 449, 130 S. E. 17, (1925).
4o. Holton v. Janes, 25 N. M. 374, 183 Pac. 395 (1939).

41. Louisville Ry. Co. v. Hartlede, 74 S. W. 742 (Ky. Ct. App. I903); Owens v. Kansas City, St. Jos. R. R., 95 Mo. i69, 8 S. W. 350 (1888).
42. 213 S. W. 144 (Kan. City, Mo., Ct. App. 1919).
43. Benefiel v. Eagle Brass Foundry, 154 Wash. 330, 282 Pac. 213 (192!9).
44. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N. E. 611 (1931).
45. Alabama G. So. Ry. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514, 9 So. 722 (1891) ; Just v. Littlefield, 87
Wash. 299, 151 Pac. 780 (915).
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Even where the plaintiff personally disliked the physician named by the trial
judge, the appellate court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion." In
some jurisdictions there exists the admirable practice of appointing an independent commission of physicians to conduct the examination, 47 which is by
far the best method in use at present; it would be even better to have regular
court physicians of high standing, whose function would consist solely of conducting such examinations.
When the number of examinations to which the plaintiff may be required
to submit is the problem, the courts are fully in accord. As to whether a second
examination should be ordered after one has already been directed by the court4 8
or voluntarily permitted by the plaintiff,49 necessity is the controlling factor.
There is always a tendency, however, toward the feeling that one examination
is all that should be required, and in most cases the courts will refuse the request
for a second examination. But this is by no means a rigid rule, and, if the
defendant can show clearly that a second examination is essential for a complete
disclosure of the facts, the court will grant his petition.50
Necessity is likewise the basis for decisions on the place where the examination should be made. In Brown v. Hutzler Bros. Co.,5' the court permitted
a non pros. judgment to be entered against the plaintiff because she refused to
go to the office of the physician named by the court. The plaintiff insisted that
the examination should take place at her home, but, inasmuch as an x-ray was
needed, the court felt that it was necessary for the examination to be made at
the physician's office, and therefore refused to heed the plaintiff's objections.
Assuming that the court has granted the request for an examination, there
still remains the procedure for its enforcement. There have been dicta 52 to the
effect that a refusal by the plaintiff to obey the order directing him to submit
to an examination may be punished by contempt proceedings. Fortunately,
however, the cases do not bear out this rigorous and totally unnecessary contention. Since the only reason that the defendant desires the examination is to
rebut the evidence of the plaintiff, there is no need to adjudge the plaintiff
guilty of contempt if he refuses to submit to an examination. The method
customarily used, that of entering a non pros. judgment, 5 is sufficient to protect
the defendant. But if he desires to procure a judgment that is res judicata,"
the defendant may inform the jury that the plaintiff has refused to submit to
an examination, 5 which will prejudice the plaintiff and will quite probably
result in a verdict for the defendant. This principle seems fair, since the plain46. Black v. Bisgier, 139 Misc. 100, 248 N. Y. Supp. 555 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; cf. S. S.
Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N. E. 611 (1931).
47. Temples v. Central of Ga. Ry., 19 Ga. App. 307, 91 S. E. 502 (Ist Div. 1917) ; Boggs
v. Gosser, 55 S. W. (2d) 723 (Kan. City, Mo., App. Ct. 1932).
48. Scullin v. Vining, 127 Ark. 124, 191 S. W. 924 (1917); Shumway v. Marion, 155
Wash. 6o, 283 Pac. 444 (1929).
49. Schroth v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 280 Pa. 36, 124 Atl. 279 (1924).
5o. Rief v. Great N. Ry., 126 Minn. 43o, 148 N. W. 3o9 (1914) ; City of Valparaiso v.
Kinney, 75 Ind. App. 66o, 131 N. E. 237 (192).
51. 152 Md. 39, 136 At. 3o (1927).
52. Sibley v. Smith, 46 Ark. 275, 280 (1885) ; Schroeder v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 47 Iowa
375, 381 (1877) ; Hess. v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. R. R., 7 Co. Ct. Rep. 565, 567 (Erie C. P.
Pa. I89O).
53. Brown v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 152 Md. 39, 136 Atl. 30 (1927) ; Heilig v. Harrisburg
Rys., 17 D. & C. 509 (Dauphin County C. P. Pa., 1932). Cf. State ex rel. Carter v. Call, 64
Fla. 144, 59 So. 789 (1912) (continuance used).
54. A judgment non pros. is not res judicata. Howes v. Austin, 35 IIl. 396 (1864);
Lambert v. Sandford, 2 Blackf. 137 (Ind. 1828).
55. City of Cedartown v. Brooks, 2 Ga. App. 583, 59 S. E. 836 (19o7) ; see Cohen v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit, 250 Pa. 15, 17, 95 Atl. 315, 316 (1915) ; Williams v. Chattanooga
Iron Works, 131 Tenn. 683, 697-8, 176 S. W. 1O31, 1O35 (1915).
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tiff's refusal to submit to an examination is explainable only by a lack of good
faith and an attempt to conceal material facts.
Finally, there is the problem to what extent modern scientific devices may
be employed as an aid to the examination. The x-ray, 56 anaesthetics, 5 7 and
blood grouping tests 58 have frequently been the subject of controversy. Inspection of the cases discloses that the only generalization that can safely be made
is that the likelihood of the court's ordering a plaintiff to submit to some form
of scientific test depends, in great measure, upon the knowledge and experience
of the particular court. In the initial stage, when the new discovery of a particular scientific device has just been revealed, no court will order its use because its reliability and safety have not as yet been ascertained. In the last
stage, when the device is generally accepted as harmless, painless, and accurate,
all courts will order its use. But in the middle stage, where it is accepted by
some courts and rejected by others, the intellect of the court is the sole guide to
indicate what may be done.
This development is well illustrated by the treatment accorded to compulsory x-ray photographs in the lower courts of New York. The question
was first raised in the Third Department of the Supreme Court in I914, and
the court refused to order that an x-ray photograph be takenY' The problem
arose again in the same department ten years later, and the court ordered the
x-ray to be used. 60 In the second department, the question first arose in 1923,
when the order was refused. 61 In I29, this department, faced with the same
question, maintained its earlier position,62 although by this time the third 83 and
fourth 64 departments and another trial court of the state had taken judicial
notice of the safety of the x-ray and ordered its use. The lack of uniformity
in New York is illustrative of the stage of uncertainty during which the composition of the court is the sole guide as to what its position on the matter will
be. But by 1934, even the66recusant second department was ready to accept the
x-ray and to order its use.
The Trend
The various statutes on the subject indicate that the majority rule is being
increasingly followed throughout the United States. The first statute granting
to the courts the power to order an examination was passed by the New York
Legislature in 1893.
It had the effect of changing the common law of that
state, which theretofore had denied the trial court the power to order the plaintiff
to submit to examination." In Montana, in 1933, a statute was passed which
permitted the trial court to order an examination, 5 thus abrogating the con56. Wilson, The X-ray in, Court (1922) 7 CORN. L. Q. 202, 230-233.
57. E. g., Strudgeon v. Village of Sand Beach, io7 Mich. 496, 65 N. W. 616 (1895);
Heilig v. Harrisburg Rys., 17 D. & C. 5og (Dauphin County C. P., Pa., 1932).
58. For the latest and most comprehensive review of the scientific and legal aspects of
the blood group tests see VoGEL.HUT, THE FoRENSIC APPLICATION AND EVmENIAL VALUE OF
THE BLOOD GaOUP TESTS (1935).
59. Lasher v. S. Bolton's Sons, 161 App. Div. 381, 146 N. Y. Supp. 321 (3d Dep't 1914).
60. Hollister v. Robertson, 208 App. Div. 449, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 514 (3d Dep't 1924).
61. Van Orden v. Madow, 207 App. Div. 827, 201 N. Y. Supp. 954 (2d Dep't 1923).
62. Lacqua v. General Linen Supply Co., 227 App. Div. 794, 237 N. Y. Supp. 197 (2d
Dep't 1929).
63. Hollister v. Robertson, 2o8 App. Div. 449, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 514 (3d Dep't 1924).
64. Gilbert v. Klar, 223 App. Div. 200, 228 N. Y. Supp. 183 (4th Dep't 1928).
65. Boyland v. Libman, 129 Misc. 415, 220 N. Y. Supp. 632 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
66. Gimenez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 236 App. Div. 804, 259 N. Y. Supp. 597 (2d
Dep't 1932).
67. N. Y. Laws 1893, c.

721.

68. McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R.,
69. Mont. Laws 1933, c. 94.
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N. Y. 50, 29 N. E. 235 (1891).
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trary common law rule of that state also.
73

74

75

In Arizona,7 1 Florida, 72 New

Jersey, Rhode Island, and South Dakota statutes have been passed granting the power to the trial court, although apparently there had been no decisions
on the point in these states prior to the statutes. In Nebraska76 and Washington,7 7 statutes have been passed giving the trial court the power to order the
examination, but in these two jurisdictions the statutes are merely declaratory
of the common law.
Another indication of the modern trend is found in the number of opinions
overruling past decisions denying the power to compel examination. The only
decision permitting the court to order an examination that was subsequently
overruled was Walsh v. Sayre,7 ' but the rule laid down in that case was again
made the law of New York by statute 7 9 whereas, in Indiana,80 Nebraska,"' and
possibly Missouri,8 2 where the common law originally held that the trial court
could not order examinations, the earlier decisions were subsequently overruled, and the present rule in those states is that the trial court may make such
orders.
In conclusion, it seems that judicial treatment of the problem is undergoing a gradual change. From the feeling, so forcefully represented by the
early United States Supreme Court decision, that courts have no power to do
what they have never done before, there is now a turn toward the idea of compelling examination to prevent the miscarriage of justice.
A.B.G.
Clash of Personal and Corporate Interest as Affecting Business
Activities of Officers and Directors
Courts and writers have closely scrutinized the relationship between the
directors and officers of a corporation and the shareholders. Due to the everwidening breach between ownership on one hand and control and imnagement
on the other, numerous legal problems have resulted, not the least perplexing of
which is the extent to which corporate officials may benefit personally from
their positions. That the acquisitive instinct, which is admittedly the motivating force behind the entry into business of many individuals, combined with the
difficulties of detection and proof of managerial misconduct and with the complexities of corporate structure and corporate transactions, has frequently prejudiced legal interests of shareholders and creditors, is widely recognized; and,
as has been pointed out, all too often the financial interest of corporate officials
are served by traitorous torpedoing of the corporate craft.'
7o. May v. Northern Pac. Ry., 32 Mont. 522, 8, Pac. 328 (19o).
71. Axuz. REv. CoDE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4468.
72. FLA. ComP. GEN. LAws ANN. (1927) § 7055.

73. N. J. Laws 1931, c. 68 (including the X-ray).
74. R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) § 5004.
75. S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 2716A (including the X-ray).
76. Na. Comlp. STAT. (1929) § 14-803 (limited to action against cities).
77. WAsi. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 1230-1.
78. 52 How. Pr. 334 (N. Y. 1868).
79. N. Y. C. P. A. (Cahill, 1931) § 3o6.
8o. City of South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 (19oo) overruling Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401, 28 N. E. 86o (i8gi).
81. State ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 98 Neb. 333, 152 N. W. 748 (1915) overruling
Stuart v. Havens, 17 Neb. 211, 22 N. W. 419 (1885).
82. Compare the dictiom in Loyd v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R., 53 Mo. 509, 5,5-16
(1873) with the clear statement in Owens v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 95 Mo. 169,
178, 8 S. W. 350, 352 (1888).
I. WoRmsER, FRANKNsmTIN

INCORPORATED (1931)

135.
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But the courts have not adopted a completely laissez-faire attitude, as may
be seen from the cases hereafter discussed. These cases, in general, embrace
transactions involving the conflicting interests of the director or officer personally and the association (apart from the individual interests of shareholders
or prospective shareholders and of creditors. 2)
While there is negligible dissent from the proposition that directors stand8
in a "fiduciary relationship" and are "trustees of the corporation's property,"
the extent to which this "fiduciary relationship" shackles the director in his
individual business dealings is a matter of inquiry. The factual situations here
dealt with are in groups ranging from those where the "breach of trust" is not
questioned to the closer cases where there is some doubt as to violation of the
"fiduciary obligation".
A. Officer converting corporate assets to his own use
It is axiomatic that any attempt by the official to convert to his own use
property belonging to the corporation will agitate the courts. Equity may grant
either remedial or preventive relief. If the property can be traced, a trust will
be impressed for the benefit of the corporation. 4 Or, a representative shareholder's suit will lie to make the official account for the proceeds of such conversion.5 And, where the director uses corporate funds to purchase property
in his own name and then purports to sell it to the corporation at a large profit,
a minority shareholder may enjoin the consummation of the sale and have a
trust impressed on the property.'
The law courts will also redress such conversion in the form of damages or
other discountenance of the transaction. Thus the receiver of a corporation
is entitled to damages. 7 And in Wallace v. Oceanic Packing Co.," where the
president of a corporation attempted to destroy a valuable asset in the form
of a contract by which he and certain other individuals had become bound to
the corporation, the court frustrated the attempt. In a suit by one of these individuals to recover money paid on the contract on the ground that the president
had rescinded it on behalf of the corporation, the court held that the corporation was not bound by the president's action."
Various defenses that have been raised find little favor in the courts. In
an action for an accounting for profits made by the director from the use of
corporate moneys it has been held no defense that the corporation lost nothing
by the transaction because the money was repaid by the converting official.10
Nor is it a valid defense that the enterprise was one beyond the reasonable purpose for which the corporation was formed, for the courts will not sustain the
familiar cry of "ultra vires" as a defense to liability to account.11 And the de2. The present inquiry will not concern itself with the general problem of compensation
for the reason that the whole subject of remuneration for services may best be dealt with
separately.
3. See, e. g., Long v. Wilson Stove and Mfg. Co., 277 Ill. App. 57, 79 (1934) ; 3 Fr.nrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. i93i)
838, and cases there collected; 3 Pomtoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § io8g.
4. Gilmore v. Gilmore Drug Co., 279 Pa. 193, 123 AUt. 730 (1924).
5. Guay v. Holland System Hull Co., 244 Mass. 240, 138 N. E. 557 (923).
6. Gilmore v. Gilmore Drug Co., 279 Pa. 193, 123 At]. 73o (1924).
7. Gray v. Cornelius, 40 F. (2d) 67 (N. D. Okla. 193o).
8. 25 Wash. 143, 64 Pac. 938 (igoi).
q. Cf. Ford v. Ford Roofing Prods. Co., 285 S. W. 583 (Mo. 1926) (corporation held to
have good defense to action on note given to directors for "sale" to corporation on property
bought with corporate funds).
io. Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & Lime Co., 66 S. W. (2d) 889 (Mo. 1933).
ii. Memphis & Arkansas City Packet Co. v. Agnew, 132 Tenn. 265, 177 S. W. 949
(196). But cf. Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21 (i8go), discussed infra, p. 1O15, n. 59.
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fense that the corporation failed to file a certificate in compliance with a statutory
requirement for foreign corporations to do business in the state in which
the
12
official profited by the use of corporate funds has been flatly rejected.
B. Officer accepting bribe for relinquishment of management
Another field explored by corporate officials as a source of personal gain
is the relinquishment of management for a consideration, which may take the
form of an outright sale of offices, or more subtly, of a secret profit influencing
the judgment of the official.
As between the parties thereto, the general rule is that an agreement of an
official to abandon directorial duties, i. e., resign for a consideration, is not enforceable. 8 Thus, a director who sues on a note given as consideration for his
resignation is denied recovery 1 4 on the ground that the court will not enforce a
contract calling for the breach of a trust.15 And the resigning official must
account to the corporation (or its receiver) for consideration received pursuant
to such an agreement. 16 By the same token, where directors abdicate in favor
of incapable and irresponsible individuals, the receiver may recover damages
for losses sustained through subsequent mismanagement."
A second type of management relinquishment, generally restricted to a particular transaction, is the acceptance by a managing official of personal profit
designed to color, and indeed render impotent, the business judgment to which
the corporation is entitled. In Ellgren v. Wooley,'8 the defendant had agreed
to reimburse the director of an insolvent corporation on account of his investment in the corporation, in consideration of the director's using his official influence toward transfer of corporate property to the defendant. The court held
that the contract was not enforceable as being against public policy.' 9 Moreover, where such an agreement was completely carried out, a representative
suit
20
requiring the officer to account to the corporation was upheld.
C. Officer engaging in same general business as corporation
A much more difficult problem is the extent to which officers are privileged
to compete with the corporation by entering the same field of business activity.
Judicial expressions to the effect that a director is not precluded from engaging
in a business similar to that of the corporation provided that he does so in "good
faith," 21 are hardly helpful, but an examination of the cases may be of assistance.
12. Memphis & Arkansas City Packet Co. v. Agnew, 132 Tenn. 265, 177 S. W. 949
(i9i6).
13. Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98 (i88o).
14. Ibid.
15. Carlisle v. Smith, 234 Fed. 759 (N. D. Va. 1916). The courts have also refused to
enforce an agreement by an official to retain another as an official o.f the corporation in all
events. West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507 (i8gi) ; Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 474, I81 N. W.
io6 (192i).

16. McLure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 55 N. E. 388 (1899) ; Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427,
9I Atl. 428 (1914) (suit brought at instance of minority shareholders) ; Keystone Guard v.
Brennan, 264 Pa. 397, 107 Atl. 835 (igig). But cf. Wright v. Webb, i6g Ark. 1145; 278
S. W. 355 (925).

17. Bostwick v. Allen, I68 N. Y. I57, 61 N. E. 163 (i9oi).
18. 64 Utah 183, 228 Pac. 9o6 (924).
19. The court may take the position that the parties are in pari delicto and on that
ground refuse to entertain a suit by one of the parties to recover money paid in pursuance
of such an agreement. Cf. Fabre v. O'Donohue, 185 App. Div. 779, 173 N. Y. Supp. 472
(1st Dep't 1918).
20. Comm. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (910).
21. See Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 349, 211 Pac. 370, 371 (1922) ; Greer v.
Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 91, 92, 277 Pac. 622, 626 (1929) ; New York Auto. Co. v. Franklin,
49 Misc. 8, 14, 97 N. Y. Supp. 781, 785 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
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In some of these cases the conduct of the officer--or former officer-may
be such as to call for equitable interference, irrespective of the existing or former
relationship with the corporation. In Dodge Stationery Co. v. Dodge,22 where
the corporation did a retail business under the name of "Dodge's", a former
official severed his relationship with the orporation forming a new company and opening a store in the same block under the name of "J. S. Dodge".
The court enjoined the obvious attempt to trade on the good will of the corporation. Similarly, if the competition by the former official is in violation of
an express agreement not to compete with
the corporation, the court will grant
23
an injunction enforcing the agreement.
In some cases, competition by the officer has an immediately harmful effect
as distinguished from a long run effect on the corporation. In such cases, the
courts uniformly protect the corporation. Thus, where the president of a taxi
corporation formed a new company with a similar name, enticing away employees
and customers, a trust was impressed in favor of the corporation on his interest
in the competing corporation.2 4 Again, where the corporation required a patent
for the successful continuation of its business and the director acquired an option
on it to further his personal business, transfer of the option by him was enjoined, the court ordering the director to disclose the duration of the option so
that the complainant corporation might exercise the rights thereunder.2 5
Sometimes, knowledge acquired as an official is used to further competition
with the corporation. In Southwest Punmp & Machinery Co. z. Forslund,2 a
typical case, the defendant, while president and general manager of the plaintiff,
had induced manufacturers for the sale of whose products the corporation had
an exclusive agency, to give him the "franchises". He thereupon rifled the
corporation's files for names of customers and resigned. The court unhesitatingly
enjoined him from interfering with the business of the corporation.
Thus, it can be seen that where an official enters into a competing business
the courts will grant relief to the corporation if (I) apart from the relationship
of official and corporation, his conduct is wrongful, or (2) such competition is
immediately injurious, or (3) the competition is based on knowledge acquired
as an official. In these instances the courts are likely to find an absence of "good
faith".
It is much more difficult to determine when "good faith" is present. Despite the broad dicta announced by the courts, it would seem that the only cases
where the official has been allowed to compete have been those where the particular type of business involved a large degree of risk. Thus in Greer v. Stannard,27 the opinion was largely that:

"There is nothing in law or in equity to prevent a man from going into
as many 'wildcat' oil ventures as his inclination, credulity, and finances will
permit, so long as he does not betray any such one in which he has become
a director or officer, to his own or another's profit." 28
The director of the corporation which had been formed for the purpose of acquiring oil leases was permitted to retain profits made in a syndicate which pur22. 145 Cal. 380, 78 Pac. 879 (1904).
23. Hopper v. Western Tablet & Stationery

Corp., 66 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A. 6th, i933);
cf. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378 (19,9).
24. Red Top Taxi Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F. (2d) 236 (N. D. Cal. Ig3I).
25. Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris, 89 Atl. 249 (N. J. Eq. 1913).
26. 225 Mo. App. 262, 29 S. W. (2d) i65 (930).
27. 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (1929).

28. Id.. at 92, 277 Pac. at 626. See also Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 2rI Pac.
370 (1922) and Bliss Pet. Co. v. McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N. W. 53 (I93)
where

director was permitted to acquire oil leases also.
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chased a questionable
29 lease after an agent of the corporation had reported adversely on its value.
There are apparently no other situations where the director has been upheld in his competition.
D. Officer personally acquiring property which is potentially profitable to the
corporation
In contradistinction to the preceding situation, courts, preferring to deal
with each case on its facts, 0 hesitate to lay down rules where the official competes with his corporation in an isolated transaction securing for himself property which might have been profitable to the corporation. Starting from the
premise that the officer will not be permitted to assume a position "adverse" to
the corporation, 3' the question then becomes what constitutes an "adverse" position, so that the original premise is of little aid. Suppose, for example, the director buys property which the corporation needs and when called to account
defends on the ground that the vendor had previously refused to sell to the corporation? Is the director's position adverse to the corporation when he negotiates for the property for himself or when he finally acquires it individually?
The answer to this and similar questions may be found in the attitude of the
courts in various typical situations.
Perhaps the most obvious proposition is that it is a breach of trust for an
official entrusted with the duty of negotiating on behalf of the corporation to
take the conveyance for himself. Thus where the director took title in his own
name and then brought ejectment against the corporation which had taken possession, the court enjoined the action, decreeing that he was constructive trustee
for the corporation.12 And where the official sought equitable aid to enjoin the
corporation from interfering with his possession, the chancellor had little hesitancy in denying relief, the theory again being that he held the land in trust for
the corporation. 33 For profits made as a result of acquiring the property personally, the official must account to the corporation. 4
Several cases have arisen where the official while acting in his official position has obtained knowledge of the desirability of a particular business opportunity and has then capitalized on that information for his individual benefit.
In a typical case, where the director went so far as to use corporate funds to
prospect mining lands, the court enjoined his claiming any title to them. 3
Even more frequent are cases where the official uses his own funds in exploiting
for himself knowledge he obtained while transacting corporate business. In this
situation also the courts readily grant relief to the corporation. 8
29. See also New York Auto. Co. v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 97 N. Y. Supp. 781 (Sup. Ct.
19o5) where the director was allowed to compete in the automobile manufacturing business
at a time when the auto was still in a highly experimental stage.
30. "Just when this fiduciary relationship ends and personal rights atiach in ordinary
business dealings is sometimes difficult of definition. . . . No hard and fast rule can be
laid down as to the line of demarcation." Young v. Columbia Oil Co. of W. Va., I1o W.
Va. 364, 37I, 158 S. E. 678, 681 (i931).
31. See FLETcHER, op. cit supra note 3, § 861.
32. The Trenton Banking Co. v. McKelway, 8 N. J. Eq. 84 (1849).
33. Blake v. Buffalo Creek R. R., 56 N. Y. 485 (87).
34. Michigan Crown Fender Co. v. Welch, 211 Mich. 148, 178 N. W. 684 (1920) ; Douglas-Whisler Brick Co. v. Simpson, 233 Pa. 515, 82 Atl. 759 (1912) ; cf. Rickert v. White, 54
Misc. 114, lO5 N. Y. Supp. 653 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
35. De Bardeleben v. Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 14o Ala. 621, 37 So. 511
(i9o3). The official had also made misrepresentations to the effect that he was holding the
land for the corporation when in fact he had no such intent. Cf. Beatty v. Guggenheim
Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378 (1919).
36. Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 138 N. W. 839 (913) ; see Rose v.
First National Bank of Styles, 93 Okla. 12o, 219 Pac. 715 (1923) ; cf. Becher, v. Contoure
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Where the official induces the corporation to refrain from purchasing the
courts likewise grant relief. An interesting case is WabungaLand Co. v. Schwanbeck.Y7 Here the corporation's obligation was offered at a discount. Its creditor was bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy desired to liquidate the claim.
The director informed the rest of the board that in order to settle the obligation
at such a low figure certain court officials would have to be bribed. After the
remaining directors rightly denounced the proposition, the director bought the
claim himself without resorting to bribery or any other illegal method. The
court held that the purchasing director could not enforce the claim at its face
value since he was under a duty to settle it on behalf of the corporation. In this
connection, it is significant that most courts do not permit a director to enforce
corporate obligations acquired at a discount for more than 38the cost of acquisition,
even in the absence of misrepresentations by the official.
Similarly, the director who induces a third person to refrain from dealing
with the corporation, but instead to deal with him, must account for profits made
thereby.39 One case went so far as to hold directors liable for such conduct to
an individual to whom they had contracted
to sell some of their shares but who
40
had not yet become a shareholder.

But, even where the director does not affirmatively induce the corporation or the third party to refrain from dealing with each other, he may sometimes be under a duty not to deal for himself. Thus, where the property involved
is essential to the proper functioning of the corporate enterprise, the corporation
may impress a trust or compel an accounting. For example, the corporation has
a license to manufacture patented articles. The director personally takes an
assignment of the patent right. The corporation may impress a trust on the
patent rights; 41 it may compel the director to account for profits; 42 moreover, it
is under no duty to pay royalties to an assignee
with knowledge of a director who
4
acquired the patent rights individually.
So too, in the lease cases where the director takes the renewal in his own
name a trust will be impressed for the benefit of the corporation. 44 If there
are any profits they must be accounted for, to the corporation. 45 If the corpoLaboratories, 279 U. S. 388 (1929). And where the official knew the corporation desired certain asphalt and took the contract personally, he was held accountable for profits from a sugsequent sale to the corporation. Asphalt Const. Co. v. Banker, i5o App. Div. 691, 135 N. Y.
Supp. 714 (ist Dep't 1912).
37. 245 Mich. 505, 222 N. W. 707 (1929).
38. It re McRory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) ; Young v. Columbia
Land & Inv. Co., 53 Ore. 438, 99 Pac. 936 (igog) ; Hill v. Frazier, 22 Pa. 320 (857) ; cf.
Billings v. Shaw, 2o9 N. Y. 265, io3 N. E. 142 (1912). Under special circumstances the
official has been allowed to enforce the claim at the face value. In re Allen-Foster-Willet
Co., 227 Mass. 55I, 116 N. E. 875 (917) (director acquired claim at time when the corporation was in the hands of an independent receiver) ; Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Association, i44 N. Y. 333, 3 N. E. 365 (1895). For collection of authorities see FREY, CASES
AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1935)
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39. Chicago Flexotile Floor Co. v. Lane, I88 Minn. 422, 247 N. W. 517 (1933) ; Cook
v. Deeks, [i916] I A. C. 554; cf. Beaudette v. Graham, 267 Mass. 7, I65 N. E. 671 (I92!)
(corporation engaged in selling appliances allowed to set aside transaction whereby official
who took "sales franchise" for appliances in his own name traded it to corporation for
shares). But cf. LaGarde v. Anniston Lime and Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. igg (I9OO).
40. Coleman v. Hanger, 21o Ky. 309, 275 S. W. 784 (925).
41. American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, ig8 Mass. 182, 84 N. E. 133 (I9O8) ; Averill
v. Barber, 53 Hun 636, 6 N. Y. Supp. 255 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
42. Averill v. Barber, 53 Hun 636, 6 N. Y. Supp. 255 (Sup. Ct. I889).
43. Farwell v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 124 N. E. 449 (i919).
44. McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. io3 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6); H. C. Girard Co.
v. Lamoreux, 227 Mass. 277, 116 N. E. 572 (917) ; Pikes Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich.
412, 123 N. W. i9 (igog) ; cf. McKay v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 2o5 N. W. 583 (1925).
45. McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6).
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ration is caused a loss by the director's attempt to lease the property for himself,
damages may be recovered at law. 46 It has been held, however, that where the
lessor refuses to re-lease to the corporation and inserts in the lease to the official
a covenant not to assign, the director will not be enjoined from interfering with
the possession of the corporation. 47 On the other hand, the fact that the corporation is bankrupt does not give the official the privilege to take the renewal
personally since the "expectancy" of a renewal of a lease to the lessee belongs
not only to the corporation-tenant but to its assignee in bankruptcy.4"
Thus, under the following circumstances, the official is under a duty not
to acquire personally property which is potentially profitable to the corporation:
(i) where he has been directed to purchase for the corporation; or (2) where
he has obtained knowledge through his official position of the value of the property; or (3) where he has induced the corporation to refrain from purchasing;
or (4) where he has induced the third person not to deal with the corporation;
or (5) where the property is peculiarly necessary to the corporation.
But there are cases where the official is privileged to acquire property.
Where there is an express agreement permitting him to do so or where the
officer reserves the privilege to take contracts in his own behalf, even though
potentially profitable to the corporation such conduct has been held justified.49
And consequently he may retain the profits he has realized. 50 The courts, in
general, will not permit the corporation to assume an inconsistent position, so
that if, acting independently, it once casts aside an opportunity, it will not be
heard later to decry the director's conduct in taking it personally. Particularly
is this so where the director expends his own funds in purchasing on behalf
of the corporation, to be met with a flat disclaimer by the board of directors.
A subsequent bill to impress a trust is quite properly dismissed. 51 The same
result has been reached on a showing that the corporation definitely abandoned
,efforts to secure certain property. Thus, in Thilco Timber Co. v. Sawyer 52 the
corporation occupied land as cotenant with a disinterested outsider. The cotenant's title was being sold at a tax sale. Advised by counsel that it was
precluded from purchasing because of cotenancy relationship, the corporation
abandoned efforts to secure the tax title. Thereafter the director acquired it for
the business and sought to
himself. Creditors of the corporation took over
impress a trust. The court dismissed the bill.5"
In other cases the unwillingness of the corporation to participate in the
particular venture may be manifested not in an express rejection, nor in an
abandonment of previous efforts to consummate the transaction but may rest
merely in a recognized business policy not so to risk corporate assets. On such
embarks on the enterprise for his own
a showing, the director who thereafter
54
benefit is entitled to his profits.
46. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co. v. McGraw, io6 Md. 536, 68 AtI. 17 (9o5).
47. Jacksonville Cigar Co. v. Dozier, 53 Fla. lO59, 43 So. 523 (19o7) ; Crittenden &
Cowler, 66 App. Div. 95, 72 N. Y. Supp. 701 (3d Dep't 1goi). But cf. Keech v. Sandford,
25 Eng. Reprints 223 (Ch. 1726).
48. Pikes Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich. 412, 123 N. W. 19 (igog).
49. Anderson v. Dunnegan, 217 Iowa 1210, 25o N. W. 115 (1933). In some cases, while
there is no agreement, there may be a definite understanding that the official is to continue
efforts on his own behalf in that particular field of business activity. See, e. g., Bliss Petroleum Co. v. McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N. W. 53 (1931).
5o. Anderson v. Dunnegan, 217 Iowa 121o, 250 N. W. 115 (1933).
51. Sandy River R. R. v. Stubbs, 77 Me. 86, 2 Atl. 9 (1885); cf. Cowell v. McMillan,
177 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 9th, 191o) ; Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P.
(2d) 429 (1935) ; Lange Soap Co. v. Ward, 269 S. W. 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
52. 236 Mich. 401, 21o N. W. 2o4 (1926).

53. Cf. Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1893).
54. Lancaster Loose-Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky. 313, 250 S. W. 997 (1923);
cf. Pioneer Oil Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, I5I So. 161 (1933), discussed infra, p. l17,
n. 71.

NOTES

Parallel with unwillingness of the corporation to do business, is the situation where the third party is unwilling to deal with the corporation. Assuming
that the official has in no way influenced the choice of the other party to the
transaction, it would seem that he is thereafter privileged to take the opportunity to himself, and may retain the profits.5 5 As has been pointed out, two
courts have been remarkably liberal to the director who took the renewal of a
lease formerly held by the corporation. 6 While both pointed out their hesitancy to force a tenant on a landlord, the decisions were based largely on the
unwillingness of the lessor to lease to the corporation. The same result might,
therefore, have been5 7 reached by the court if the action had been to compel the
director to account.

Another factor which has influenced the court to reach a decision for the
official is the presence of some legal disability on the part of the corporation.
Thus, in Barr v. PittsburghPlate Glass Co. 8 the court attached much weight
to the fact that the questioned transaction would, as it thought, have been beyond
the powers conferred by the corporation's charter. An extreme case is Case v.
Kelly,59 where public-spirited citizens had donated lands to a railroad, which was
building its lines through the community. Self-interested directors, however,
took conveyances for their own use. The court refused to impress a trust on
behalf of the railroad, saying that it would not "be an active agent in aiding the
corporation to breach the law by acquiring lands not authorized by charter."
The weakness of the decision in allowing the director to plead "ultra vires" as
a defense to a theft from the corporation is too obvious for discussion. That
it is inconsistent with other decisions is minor.60 That the court should be influenced by such a plea where the director has risked his own funds, as in Barr
v. PittsburghPlate Glass Co., is somewhat justifiable, but where he is a mere
volunteer taking a deed on the false representation that the land is to be held
for the corporation, there seems to be no justice in the familiar cry of "ultra
vires". That a modem court would follow Case v. Kelly is dubious.
A much more realistic attitude was taken in Young v. The Columbia Oil
Co.61 There, the directors sought government patents to gas lands on behalf
of their corporation. They were informed by the United States Land Department that for those purposes a corporation was considered an individual
entitled to a patent on twenty acres only. On advice of counsel, each of eight
directors made individual entries for twenty acres apiece. Oil was struck.
Minority shareholders individually compelled the profiting directors to account,
the court holding that it was the duty of the directors, on learning of the limitations on the corporation's power to acquire patents, to notify all the shareholders so as to give them an opportunity to compete for the valuable gas lands.
A more difficult problem arises where the corporation is under a financial
disability. If the corporation is insolvent to such a degree that it cannot carry
on business, the director may acquire property and contracts which would
55. Davis v. Pearce, 3o F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Kendall v. Webster, ro West
L. 1. 442 (B. C. 19o9) ; cf. Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Davidson, 95 Mo. 467, 8
S. W. 545 (1888).
56. Crittenden Cowler Co. v. Cowler, 66 App. Div. 95, 72 N. Y. Supp. 701 (3d Dep't
igoi) ; Jacksonville Cigar Co. v. Dozier, 53 Fla. lo5g, 43 So. 523 (19o7) ; see supra note 47.
57. See Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 2H1 Pac. 370, 371 (1922)

where the lower

court's finding for the director was affirmed, the court remarking that there was no evidence
that the property could have been bought by the corporation.
58. 57 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1893). In addition, the shareholders had refused to extend
the corporate activity to the questioned transaction.
59. 133 U. S. 21 (890).
6o. See cases cited note ii supra.
6I. io W. Va. 364, 58 S. E. 678 (I93I); Note (1932) W. VA. L. Q. 158.
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otherwise have been profitable to the corporation, 62 whether the corporation is
in the hands of a receiver 13 or has simply ceased doing business. 64 The director
in such case has been held under no duty to account. 65
But where there is mere financial inability as distinguished from insolvency and a discontinuance of business, the courts differ in attitude. According
to one view, proof that the corporation lacked the necessary funds and credit
to carry out the transaction allows the director to profit personally.66 The basic
philosophy is that the corporation cannot avail itself of the opportunity, and it
is therefore immaterial who does take it.67 This view assumes that directors
will always use sincere efforts to secure the necessary funds or credit for the
corporation-or be exposed if they fail to do so.
The other attitude is expressed by Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch 68 where

the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the directors to account.
The court looked with suspicion upon their assertion that they were unable to
raise the necessary money on the credit of the corporation to carry out a favorable contract which had already been entered into by the corporation, although
there was no clear proof either way.
Of the two, the latter view seems the sounder. In the first place, the director usually finds it not impossible to raise the necessary money for his own
benefit, which is some indication as to his efforts on behalf of the corporation.
In the second place, allowing a director to take over the contract on the grounds
of financial inability of the corporation lays open a wide field for managerial
disloyalty. It is all too easy for a conniving official to convey the appearance
that the corporation's position is financially unsound. The grant or denial of a
loan may often depend on a word or gesture, even a tonal inflection, employed
in the course of negotiations. Fact-finding difficulties after the event make it
nearly impossible to determine whether the director dutifully sought to secure
funds for the association. 69 On practical considerations, therefore, the Irving
Trust case appears correct.
62. Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68, i53 S. W. 5o (1913).
63. Kidder v. Wittler-Corbin Mach. Co., 38 Wash. 179, 8o Pac. 301 (i9o5) ; cf. Murray
v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140 (N. Y. 1863). But cf. Pikes Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, i58 Mich.
412, x23 N. W. i9 (19o9), supra note 48. In Buchler v. Black, 226 Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 9th,
1915) the court refused to impress a trust on property owned by the corporation and bought
by the official at a foreclosure sale, part of receivership proceedings.
64. Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68, 153 S. W. 50 (1913).
65. See cases supra notes 64, 65.
66. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 12 Ariz. 145, ioo Pac. 784 (io9) ; Hannerty v. Standard
Theatre Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19 S. W. 82 (i89i) ; Grand Amusement Co. v. Palladium Amusement Co., 315 Mo. 907, 287 S. W. 438 (1926); Green v. Hall, 228 S. W. 183 (Tex. Comm.
App. i92Y) ; cf. Bentley v. Hetrick, 104 N. J. Eq. 535, 146 Atl. 320 (1929).
67. A further argument is that it may be to the advantage of the association in that the
opportunity is at least saved from going to a stranger. See, for example, Presidio Mining
Co. v. Overton, 261 Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) where, the corporation being financially
unable, the official acquired a mine and leased it to the corporation. He was held entitled to
profits made on the lease. But cf. Wing v. Dillingham, 239 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917).
68. 73 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 294 U. S. 708 (i935). The district
court had found for the defendant. 2 F. Supp. 971 (S. D. N. Y. 1932) ; cf. Wing v. Dillingham, 239 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917).
69. "The law lays upon such directors the duty of frankness and fair dealing with the
shareholders. This doctrine has its roots largely in the principle of public policy. Its application does not depend upon a showing by the cestui que trust that there was fraud in the
transaction but is applied that others may be restrained from taking advantage of like situations. There may be fraud and the cestui que trust unable to show it. The latter is not in
control of the transactions, but the former are and have the power and opportunity to make
a record and develop such facts as may tend to justify their acts." Young v. The Columbia
Oil Co. of W. Va., iio W. Va. 354, 374, 158 S. E. 678, 682 (i93i). See also Cumberland
Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 605 (1875).

NOTES

Occasionally a case presents a combination of factors enumerated above
so that it is difficult to tell precisely what caused the court to reach its decision.
In Pioneer Oil Co. v. Anderson,70 for example, the corporation sought to compel the director to convey a fractional interest in an oil lease for which the corporation had negotiated. The defense was that the corporation was in bad financial condition; that it was against the business policy to acquire as small a fraction as was involved; and that in any event the former owners would not have
conveyed to the corporation. Under these circumstances, the court found for
the directors.
It may be concluded, then, that under the following circumstances the official
is privileged to acquire property potentially profitable to the corporation: (i)
where there is an express understanding that he may do so; (2) where the corporation acting independently refuses to engage in a particular transaction; (3)
where the other party to the transaction independently refuses to deal with the
corporation; (4) where the corporation is under some legal disability; and (5)
where the corporation is either being wound up or has ceased to do business
because of insolvency.
Conclusion
The cases considered lead to at least one conclusion: despite the many obstacles in the way of shareholders suits, the courts have on numerous occasions
caught up with double-dealing directors. Some writers have despaired of ever
formulating a set of legal rules which will have the practical effect of protecting
the collective interests of shareholders and creditors.7 1 The alternative suggested
is the gradual evolution of a code of ethics fostered by businessmen themselves.
But the fear that such an evolution will be slow, and indeed, slower than the
workings of the legal machinery presently available to wronged shareholders,
requires that discussion continue on the legal relations arising out of the assumption of an official position with a corporation.
In cases of theft and bribery the courts are as one in holding the corrupt
official responsible for losses to the corporation or for profits realized by the
official. In the cases of competition either for customers or property, the border
line between allowable gains and illicit profits is not always clear. In such cases
much will depend on the attitude of the particular court as to the advisability of
shackling directors and officials in their personal business dealings.
Arguments can be made on behalf of liberality toward directors. In Cook
v. Deeks the lower court, in upholding directors, remarked that:
"the trend of decision is rather to restrict the responsibility and increase the
discretion of directors, and to free them from the serious burdens which
trustees are still carrying, provided they make proper disclosure to, and
obtain the consent of the company." 72
Otherwise, the court argued, capable men must hesitate to assume directorships.
But the upper court, in reversing, answered:
"It is quite right to point out the importance of avoiding the establishment
of rules as to directors' duties which would impose on them burdens so
heavy and responsibilities so great that men of good position would hesitate to accept the office. But, on the other hand, men who assume the conP.

7o. 168 Miss. 384, 151 So. 16i (I934) ; cf. Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra
1oi5,
and note 58; Bancroft v. Olympic Coal & Mining Co., H17 Wash.

211, 200

Pac. iO8r

(1921).
71. See Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the FiduciaryDuties of Corporate Managers
Practicable? (1934) 2 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 194, 197.
72. 21 D. L. R. 497, 500, 33 Ont. L. R. 222 (1915).
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plete control of a company's business must remember that they are not at
liberty to sacrifice the interests they are bound to protect, and while ostensibly acting for the company, divert in their own favor business which
should properly belong to the company they represent." 71
This desire to protect as much as possible the interest of shareholders or creditors as against the officers, equally evidenced in the Iming Trust case, is especially present where the balance of equities may ultimately rest on a fact difficult
of proof.
Such a judicial attitude must be commended. While it may not have the
effect of removing the ever-present temptation to be false to the "fiduciary obligation", it will, to some extent, add to the far from adequate protection now
accorded to the interests of shareholders and creditors.
D.B.
73. Cook v. Deeks [1916] I A. C. 554, 563.

